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INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by reprehensible cyber opera-
tions directed against medical facilities and capabilities, as well as by a flood of
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misinformation. In the Czech Republic, for example, Brno University Hospital was
targeted in an as yet unattributed attack that forced the facility to shut down its IT
network and that bled over into the affiliated Children’s Hospital and the Maternity
Hospital. Urgent surgeries had to be postponed, and the hospital could not perform
its role as a designated COVID-19 testing center.1 Similarly, cyber criminals have
conducted ransomware attacks targeting medical facilities, including one against
Hammersmith Medicines Research, which was on standby in the United Kingdom
to test vaccines. Although the primary attack was foiled, patient medical data were
exfiltrated and held for ransom.2 Many other hostile cyber operations that directly
interfered with the delivery of care, medical logistics, and the research necessary to
effectively fight the virus and its spread have occurred around the world.3
So too have hostile cyber operations been directed against public health activ-
ities. For instance, one took down the Champaign-Urbana Public Health
District’s website, on which vital COVID-19 information was being posted. As a
result, alternative websites had to be activated to ensure that the information was
available to the public.4 At the national level, the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services was the target of a distributed denial of service attack lasting
several hours, although it fortunately failed to significantly affect the agency’s
systems. A state actor is suspected of having conducted the operation.5
And the World Health Organization, which despite politicized claims to the
contrary plays a critical role in the global response to the pandemic, was sub-
jected to malicious cyber operations that tried to secure the passwords of its per-
sonnel. Although the motives remain unclear, the head of global research and
analysis at the Kaspersky cyber security firm noted that “[a]t times like this, any
information about cures or tests or vaccines relating to coronavirus would be
priceless and the priority of any intelligence organization of an affected coun-
try.”6 Cyber criminals have also engaged in phishing attacks impersonating the
1. Catalin Cimpanu, Czech Hospital Hit by Cyberattack While in the Midst of a COVID-19 Outbreak,
ZDNET (Mar. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/E4N9-XFHT; Sean Lyngaas, Czech Republic’s Second-
Biggest Hospital is Hit by Cyberattack, CYBERSCOOP (Mar. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/3QDR-WXDH.
2. Davey Winder, COVID-19 Vaccine Test Center Hit by Cyber Attack, Stolen Data Posted Online,
FORBES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/E96C-H5R2.
3. Aaron Holmes, Hackers are Targeting Hospitals Already Stretched Thin from Fighting the
Coronavirus—and Experts Say the Worst Cyberattacks May Still Be to Come, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 14,
2020), https://perma.cc/LY8C-X49Q; Europe’s Largest Private Hospital Operator Fresenius Hit by
Ransomware, KREBSONSECURITY (May 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/4RAB-XS74; Joseph Marks,
Hospitals Face a Surge of Cyberattacks during the Novel Coronavirus Pandemic, WASH. POST (Apr. 15,
2020), https://perma.cc/YWX7-C4G8.
4. Debra Pressey, C-U Public Health District’s Website Held Hostage by Ransomware Attack, NEWS
GAZ. (Champaign, IL), Mar. 11, 2020, https://perma.cc/GM7B-TDBL.
5. Shira Stein & Jennifer Jacobs, Cyber-Attack Hits U.S. Health Agency Amid COVID-19 Outbreak,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/ZC47-AXER.
6. Raphael Satter, Jack Stubbs & Christopher Bing, Elite Hackers Target WHO as Coronavirus
Cyberattacks Spike, REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2020, 3:08 PM), https://perma.cc/D7NP-9THA.
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WHO to gain access to information in personal computers, in one case distribut-
ing a fake “My Health e-book” attachment containing a file with malware.7
Additionally, the COVID-19 crisis has spawned an epidemic of online misinfor-
mation. At times, the claims have been farcical. For instance, individuals in the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands have vandalized phone masts in reaction to
online conspiracy theories tying the construction of 5G masts to the pandemic.8
Often the claims are politically motivated, as with suggestions that the virus was cre-
ated in, and escaped from, a Chinese laboratory. In the United States, the Director of
the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, Dr. Anthony Fauci, found
it necessary to debunk the story, which had been impliedly supported by President
Trump during one of his lengthy news conferences.9 And the scale of the misinfor-
mation is truly daunting.10 According to the British regulator Ofcom, “almost half of
UK online adults came across false or misleading information about the coronavirus
(COVID-19)” in a single week in early April 2020.11
The contemporary power of misinformation and “fake news” to polarize soci-
eties and politics is hardly surprising. But the convergence of COVID-19 and vi-
ral misinformation is unique in its potential to cause significant societal harm, for
the “infodemic” is disrupting the coordinated, medically sound response that is
necessary to control the spread of the virus.12 Tragically, it is even directly caus-
ing large-scale loss of human life. Consider Iran, where the government has
reported that hundreds died after ingesting methanol or other high-proof alcohol,
falsely believing social media claims that doing so would protect them from the
virus.13
Some states appear to be leveraging the crisis to seek advantage in cyberspace.
For example, the Syrian government has allegedly exploited the pandemic to dis-
tribute surveillance malware through watering hole attacks and third party app
stores.14 And a report by the State Department’s Global Engagement Center,
which has not been made public, apparently accuses China, Iran, and Russia of
7. Malwarebytes Labs, Cybercriminals Impersonate World Health Organization to Distribute Fake
Coronavirus E-book (Mar. 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/5ERJ-78TQ.
8. The theories range from 5G causing COVID-19 to the lockdown measures being imposed as a
distraction from the construction of 5G infrastructure and its alleged ill-effects. Jim Waterson & Alex
Hern, At Least 20 UK Phone Masts Vandalised Over False 5G Coronavirus Claims, GUARDIAN (Apr. 6,
2020), https://perma.cc/FJ34-FTPT; Dutch Telecommunications Towers Damaged by 5G Protestors:
Telegraaf, REUTERS (Apr. 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/3LC8-25LD.
9. John Haltiwanger, Dr. Fauci Throws Cold Water on Conspiracy Theory that Coronavirus Was
Created in a Chinese Lab, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/PP8A-HPER.
10. Aaron Holmes, Roughly Half the Twitter Accounts Pushing to “Reopen America” Are Bots,
Researchers Found, BUS. INSIDER (May 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/3VHL-N3A4.
11. Ofcom, Half of UK Adults Exposed to False Claims about Coronavirus (Apr. 9, 2020), https://
perma.cc/MWM7-CT74.
12. John Zarocostas, How to Fight an Infodemic, LANCET (Feb. 29, 2020); Coronavirus Myths
Explored, MED. NEWS TODAY (April 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/JZ9Q-FCD2.
13. Bel Trew, Coronavirus: Hundreds Dead in Iran from Drinking Methanol Amid Fake Reports It
Cures Disease, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/257C-CR9G.
14. Lookout Research: Nation-State Mobile Malware Targets Syrians with COVID-19 Lures,
SECURITY (Apr. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/RS8J-966L.
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exploiting the crisis for propaganda and disinformation purposes against the
United States. Those countries have reportedly suggested that COVID-19 is an
American bioweapon, that China was not the source of the virus but that instead
it was spread by U.S. troops, that the Trump administration’s response was flawed
while that of China was effective, and that the U.S. economy will be unable to tol-
erate the crisis. In some cases, state-run media outlets made the allegations, while
in others government agencies were the source of the claims. As an example,
Russia’s defense ministry operates a website that has alleged Bill Gates had a
role in creating the virus.15 While the validity of these assertions, as well as those
made against the three countries, may be a matter of contention, it is clear that
online sources are being weaponized for political purposes by exploiting the
pandemic.
Our goal in this article is to map the various obligations of states under general
international law and human rights law with regard to malicious cyber and misin-
formation operations conducted by state and non-state actors during the pan-
demic. In Part I we consider cyber operations against health care facilities and
capabilities during the COVID-19 pandemic, including public health activities
operated by the government, and how such operations, when attributable to a
state, can violate the sovereignty of other states, the prohibitions of intervention
and the use of force, and the human rights of affected individuals. In Part II we
perform a similar analysis with regard to state misinformation operations, espe-
cially those that directly or indirectly affect human life and health, whether such
misinformation is targeting the state’s own population or those of third states. In
Part III we turn to the positive obligations states have to protect their populations
from hostile cyber and misinformation operations, to the limits human rights law
imposes on efforts to combat misinformation, and to protective obligations to-
ward third states and their populations.
I. STATE CYBER OPERATIONS AGAINST HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS DURING
THE PANDEMIC
From an international law point of view, it is especially significant that states
and state backed hackers appear to be involved in some of the hostile cyber opera-
tions against health facilities and capabilities during the COVID-19 pandemic,16
for international law generally governs the acts of states or those that are attribut-
able to them, pursuant to the law of state responsibility. The lawfulness of cyber
operations conducted by non-state actors, such as criminals, hacktivists, or terro-
rist groups, is generally not assessed by reference to international law. Instead,
such activities are subject to the law of any state that enjoys prescriptive jurisdic-
tion over the conduct and is in a position to exercise its enforcement or judicial
15. Betsy Woodruff Swan, Russian, Chinese and Iranian Disinformation Narratives Echo One
Another, Report Says, POLITICO (Apr. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/CY3C-TBDB.
16. Dado Ruvic, U.S., UK Cyber Officials Say State-backed Hackers Taking Advantage of Outbreak,
REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/RCU7-UPYR.
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jurisdiction.17 Therefore, the first step in analyzing such operations is to deter-
mine who conducted them.
To determine whether a state is responsible for violating international law with
respect to a cyber operation against a health facility or capability, or public health
activity, the operation must be legally attributable to that state, and the act must
have violated an international law obligation it owed the target state. In the par-
lance of the law of state responsibility, the “responsible state” will have commit-
ted an “internationally wrongful act” against the “injured state” upon the
confluence of these two conditions.18
Attribution is clearest when the cyber operation is conducted by organs of the
state, like the intelligence services, cyber agency, or armed forces.19 However,
states often turn to non-state groups, such as political hacktivists, terrorist groups,
or the private sector to conduct their cyber operations. While there are several sit-
uations in which the actions of a non-state actor may be attributed to a state as a
matter of law,20 the most common involves the non-state entity “in fact acting on
the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying
out the conduct.” The International Law Commission confirmed the customary
status of this “secondary” rule of international law in its Articles on State
Responsibility, a decades-long effort to restate that body of law.21
COVID-19-related cyber operations appear to have been committed both by
state de jure organs and by other entities whose conduct is attributable to a state.22
The Netherlands announced, for example, that it
is appalled by the abuse of the COVID-19 crisis by States to conduct or effec-
tively control non-state actors in launching cyber operations, including the dis-
ruption of the healthcare sector, and cyber enabled information operations to
interfere with the crisis response in times of urgent crisis. Not only are these
operations highly deplorable examples of irresponsible state behaviour; in
many instances, they constitute violations of international law.23
17. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS ch. 3
(Michael N. Schmitt gen. ed. 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0].
18. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, art. 2, U.N. GAOR, 56th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 32, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility].
19. Id. art. 4.
20. These include acting as a de facto organ of the state, exercising elements of government
authority, acting in the absence or default of the official authorities, and engaging in conduct that is
acknowledged and adopted by a state as its own. Id. arts. 4–5, 9, and 11, respectively.
21. Id. art. 8. Primary rules of international law set forth rights and obligations, whereas secondary
rules involve the responsibility of states and remedies such as assurances, guarantees, and reparations.
22. Peter Beaumont, Julian Borger & Daniel Boffey, Malicious Forces Creating “Perfect Storm” of
Coronavirus Disinformation, GUARDIAN, (Apr. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/ZA3Q-NH48; Edward
Wong, Matthew Rosenberg & Julian E. Barnes, Chinese Agents Helped Spread Messages That Sowed
Virus Panic in U.S., Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/33WT-E6FZ.
23. The Kingdom of the Netherlands’ Response to the Pre-draft Report of the OEWG [UN Open-
Ended Working Group], ¶2 (n.d.), https://perma.cc/9XY5-SFXG.
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And the Cyber Security Centre of the Australian Signals Directorate has
warned that Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors are targeting the nation’s
health sector and COVID-19 essential services.24 APT cyber operations are most
frequently thought to be conducted by states because of the operational sophisti-
cation that is necessary to mount them.
The discussion that follows in this Part and the next will focus on state cyber
operations against health care systems during the pandemic, that is, operations
that are attributable to a state, irrespective of the precise attribution rule that
would be applicable on the given facts. Such state operations can potentially vio-
late several primary obligations under international law. These include (1) sover-
eignty; (2) the principle of non-intervention; (3) the prohibition on the use of
force; and (4) the human rights to life and health.
A. Violation of Sovereignty
The most likely international law obligation to be breached by a state’s cyber
operation against a health facility or capability, or public health activities, is the
obligation to respect the sovereignty of other states. Before discussing the manner
in which that obligation might be breached, it must be cautioned that one state—
the United Kingdom—has formally taken the position that no such legal rule
exists. In its view, sovereignty is but a principle of international law from which
primary rules like the prohibition on intervention and that on the use of force em-
anate, but that it is incapable of being violated on its own.25
The United States has wisely refrained from providing complete support in this
regard for its closest ally. In a February 2020 speech at the U.S. Cyber Command,
Paul Ney, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, observed that
States have sovereignty over the information and communications technology
infrastructure within their territory. The implications of sovereignty for cyber-
space are complex, and we continue to study this issue and how State practice
evolves in this area, even if it does not appear that there exists a rule that all
infringements on sovereignty in cyberspace necessarily involve violations of
international law.26
Note the hedging, fence-sitting language—not even the staunchest sovereignt-
ist would claim that all cyber operations against a state necessarily violate its sov-
ereignty. In short, the United States has so far refrained from providing a
sufficiently clear articulation of its views on whether sovereignty is a primary
24. CYBER SECURITY CENTRE, AUSTRALIAN SIGNALS DIRECTORATE, ADVISORY 2020-009:
ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREAT (APT) ACTORS TARGETING AUSTRALIAN HEALTH SECTOR
ORGANISATIONS AND COVID-19 ESSENTIAL SERVICES (n.d.), https://perma.cc/G8QG-M6VM.
25. Jeremy Wright, Attorney General of the UK, Address at Chatham House, Cyber and International
Law in the 21st Century (May 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/DWZ3-WNX9.
26. Paul C. Ney, Jr., Dep’t Def. Gen. Counsel, DOD General Counsel Remarks at U.S. Cyber
Command Legal Conference (Mar. 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/QY33-NEMY (emphasis added).
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rule of international law, capable of being violated independently of any other
rule.
In reaction to the British position, a growing number of states have publicly
acknowledged sovereignty as a binding rule of international law, one that plays
an important role with respect to extraterritorial cyber operations conducted by
states. The Netherlands, for instance, has stated that “[r]espect for the sovereignty
of other countries is an obligation in its own right, the violation of which may in
turn constitute an internationally wrongful act.”27 In our view, this is the correct
legal stance. Moreover, it facilitates international condemnation of cyber opera-
tions involving the pandemic as violations of international law, for violation of
sovereignty is the easiest legal case to make.
The sovereignty of a state may be breached by cyber operations attributable to
another state in two basic ways—by causing effects on the territory of the former
or by interfering with its inherently governmental functions, even in the absence
of territorial effects.28 Both types of violations are relevant to the COVID-19-
related cyber operations.
With respect to territoriality, relatively broad consensus exists that if a cyber
operation is conducted remotely by one state into the territory of another state
and causes damage to property or injury in the latter, sovereignty has been
breached. 29 It matters not whether the target of the cyber operation is governmen-
tal or private in character or whether the individuals affected are public servants
or private persons. The essence of the breach is the causation of certain conse-
quences on the territory of the state without that state’s consent.30
Damage in this context encompasses relatively permanent interference with
the functionality of cyber infrastructure.31 Any cyber operation that renders medi-
cal equipment inoperable would qualify. Of greater immediate significance is the
fact that the notion of injury extends from cyber operations resulting in death to
those merely affecting health in some manner. Thus, by the prevailing view, any
of the cyber operations attributable to a state that have negatively affected the
health of any individuals on the state’s territory, as did those that interfered with
the immediate delivery of medical care, violated the sovereignty of that state.
27. Letter of July 5, 2019 from the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs to the President of the
House of Representatives on the International Legal Order in Cyberspace, Appendix: International Law
in Cyberspace 2, https://perma.cc/ENU3-DFGV [hereinafter Netherlands MFA Letter]. See also France,
Ministry of the Armies, International Law Applied to Operations in Cyberspace 6-7 (2019) (English
version) [hereinafter Ministry of the Armies Position Paper]; Statements of Austria, Finland, Czech
Republic, 2d Substantive Session of OEWG, Feb. 11, 2020, https://perma.cc/J269-SU36.
28. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 17, r. 4 and accompanying commentary. These two strands
of the rule are apparent in the famous 1928 Island of Palmas arbitration decision by Judge Huber:
“Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion
of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.”
Island of Palmas (Neth. v. US), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
29. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 17, r. 3.
30. Id. at 18.
31. Id. at 20–21.
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Below the aforementioned threshold of harm, no consensus has crystallized as
to when a remotely conducted cyber operation breaches the sovereignty of the
state into which it is conducted. For instance, it is unclear whether simply causing
cyber infrastructure to operate in a degraded manner or temporarily interfering
with its operation qualifies as a breach of sovereignty if the consequences of that
action do not involve injury, including illness, or physical damage. The broadest
view taken so far is that of France, which has stated that
[a]ny cyberattack against French digital systems or any effects produced on
French territory by digital means by a State organ, a person or an entity exer-
cising elements of governmental authority or by a person or persons acting on
the instructions of or under the direction or control of a State constitutes a
breach of sovereignty.32
For France, every cyber operation disturbing the operation of medical or public
health cyber infrastructure on French territory would be considered a violation of
its sovereignty. This is so irrespective of whether it directly impacts the health of
any individuals. Of course, any negative health outcome would qualify as an
“effect.”
At the other end of the spectrum, there appears to be consensus that espionage
per se does not violate the sovereignty of the target state, at least so long as the
method used neither causes the requisite effects, as discussed above, nor inter-
feres with inherently governmental functions, as described below.33 Therefore,
even if claims of states accusing others of attempting to steal COVID-19 vaccine
and treatment research are accurate, those actions likely would not violate inter-
national law, at least so long as the espionage activity consisted solely of the
exfiltration of research data without seriously disrupting the research project itself
and thereby indirectly causing harm to human life or health, or causing harm to
cyber infrastructure.34
Cyber operations that do not reach the qualifying threshold for harm to cyber
infrastructure, wherever that threshold may lie, will still violate sovereignty
should they cause individuals to be unable to secure COVID-19 treatment or pre-
ventive measures, and illness or aggravation of illness results. This is because the
requisite consequences for breach may be caused directly or indirectly. For
instance, a denial of service attack against a website providing information on vi-
rus testing will violate sovereignty if the upshot of the information’s unavailabil-
ity is an increase in the numbers of infected individuals or exacerbation of the
illness’s severity due to individuals not having access to timely testing.
Ransomware attacks would also constitute a violation of sovereignty if such
32. Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, supra note 27, at 7.
33. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 17, r. 32.
34. David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, U.S. to Accuse China of Trying to Hack Vaccine Data, as
Virus Redirects Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2020.
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consequences manifested. The key consideration here is the intensity of the
causal connection between the cyber operation and some concrete harm.
Whether the consequences of the hostile cyber operation must be foreseeable
in order to breach sovereignty remains somewhat unsettled, although the Tallinn
Manual 2.0 International Group of Experts opined that it need not.35 This issue
has little relevance to operations involving health facilities and capabilities, and
public health activities, during a pandemic, for the scope and scale of a pandemic
is such that almost any interference with the provision of medical care and public
health activities would foreseeably impact the health of individuals.
The second means of violating sovereignty is interference with, or usurpation
of, an inherently governmental act.36 The distinction between this form of sover-
eignty violation and one based on territoriality is that there is no requirement that
any particular physical effects manifest on the state’s territory. Instead, the basis
for finding a violation is the existence of activities that states alone are entitled to
perform, the classic examples being the deprivation of liberty and law enforce-
ment more generally. Should one state interfere with the performance of such
functions by another state, or if the former engages in activities on the territory of
the other state that are reserved to the latter, a violation has occurred.
Although health care is sometimes provided exclusively or primarily by the
state, as in the case of the National Health Service in the United Kingdom, this is
not universally the case. Because providing medical care is not an inherently gov-
ernmental function, cyber operations by states that interfere with the provision of
health care in another, even if that victim state does provide health care to its own
population, do not, on that basis alone, amount to a sovereignty violation.
However, crisis management during an epidemic or a pandemic is a govern-
mental responsibility in every state and accordingly an inherently governmental
function. Any cyber operation attributable to a state that disrupts another state’s
crisis management planning and execution during a pandemic, at any level of
government, therefore qualifies as a sovereignty violation. This is so irrespective
of whether the cyber operation foreseeably places health or life at risk, because it
is the mere interference that comprises the violation, not the consequences
thereof. To illustrate, a denial of service operation that interferes with the dissem-
ination of COVID-19 information to the public, even temporarily, is unlawful on
this basis alone, even in the absence of significant adverse consequences down
the causal chain. So is any cyber operation that disrupts the government’s coordi-
nation of the acquisition, allocation and distribution of essential medical equip-
ment and supplies to the neediest areas of the country.
It is also important to note that the concept of sovereignty is linked to the
authority of the state to control its territory and exclusively perform certain func-
tions therein. This bears on the case of cyber operations directed against the
World Health Organization. International organizations do not directly enjoy
35. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 17, at 24.
36. Id. at 21–23.
2020] CYBER ATTACKS AND CYBER (MIS)INFORMATION OPERATIONS 255
the protections of the rule of sovereignty.37 Therefore, cyber operations targeting
the WHO headquarters in Geneva might qualify as a violation of Swiss territorial
sovereignty if they affect cyber infrastructure in Switzerland in a manner that
trips over the requisite threshold.38 But they would not so qualify on the basis of
interference in the WHO’s operations unless that interference somehow caused
the denial of care, or caused illness or aggravation of the virus, to individuals on
Swiss territory.
B. Violation of the Prohibition of Intervention
Hostile cyber operations by states during a pandemic can also qualify as inter-
vention into the internal affairs of another state.39 A breach of the prohibition
requires coercive interference into the domaine réservé of another state. As noted
by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua judgment, “The element of
coercion . . . forms the very essence of prohibited intervention.”40 The Dutch
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has explained that although the “precise definition of
coercion, and thus of unauthorised intervention, has not yet fully crystallised in
international law, [i]n essence it means compelling a state to take a course of
action (whether an act or an omission) that it would not otherwise voluntarily pur-
sue. The goal of the intervention must be to effect change in the behaviour of the
target state.”41
In other words, coercion deprives the injured state of choice regarding an activ-
ity it has the right to control.42 This occurs either by depriving the state of the
ability to exercise such control or by affecting the state’s will to such an extent
that its choices are no longer free ones.
Domaine réservé denotes an area of activity, often referred to as their internal
and external affairs, that is as a general matter left by international law to states.43
The concept sometimes overlaps with that of inherently governmental function,
but there is a difference. Whereas an inherently governmental function is an ac-
tivity only states perform, the domaine réservé can encompass activities
37. Hostile cyber operations against an international organization may, however, be contrary to
explicit or implicit obligations of membership that its states parties have freely accepted under the
organization’s founding treaty.
38. A comparable example would be the attempted cyber operation allegedly committed on Dutch
territory by Russian state agents against the headquarters of the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons. See Netherlands, Ministry of Defence, Netherlands Defence Intelligence and
Security Service Disrupts Russian Cyber Operation Targeting OPCW (Oct. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/
86RL-9TKB.
39. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 17, r. 66 and accompanying commentary.
40. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. 14, ¶206 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
41. Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, supra note 27, at 2.
42. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, prin. 3, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV),
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. DOC. A/RES/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970). See also TALLINN
MANUAL 2.0, supra note 17, at 317–18.
43. Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone), Advisory Opinion, 1923
P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24 (Feb. 7).
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performed by private actors so long as international law allows the state to regu-
late that activity.
It is unquestionably within the domaine réservé of a state to determine how it
will handle a health crisis, as is the actual handling of that crisis. The scope of
this authority is not limited to actions carried out by government agencies, but
instead deals with activities by both government and private health care pro-
viders, and any other relevant public health entities. Therefore, if a cyber opera-
tion by or attributable to one state obstructs the execution of another state’s plan
for responding to the pandemic, the former will have engaged in prohibited inter-
vention. This will clearly be the case if the former state intends to deprive the vic-
tim state of its ability to control its pandemic response (although the intervening
state’s motives may be varied and are legally irrelevant). It is less clear whether
this would be the case in the absence of such an intent, when the cyber operation
only has as its effect the loss of the victim state’s ability to control its pandemic
response.44
For example, if attributable to a state, the attack against the Czech medical hos-
pital that rendered it unable to perform its designated function as a COVID-19
testing facility pursuant to the Czech government’s plan was coercive. Assuming
attribution for the sake of illustration, so too was the interference with the British
vaccine testing laboratory, as it was chosen as a facility for that purpose in the
United Kingdom’s crisis management plan. The key to both incidents is that the
state was unable to execute its public health crisis response as planned.
By contrast, consider the 2017 WannaCry Ransomware attack that exploited a
vulnerability in an outdated version of Microsoft Windows to infect over 200,000
computers in more than 150 countries by encrypting computer files and demand-
ing $300 in crypto currency to restore access. The attack impacted companies
ranging from FedEx and Renault to Telefonica and Deutsche Bahn. However,
National Health Service England was hardest hit. The impact was widespread
and immediate. For instance, medical personnel were unable to access patient
records, and medical equipment was locked. As a result, appointments and proce-
dures had to be cancelled and patients diverted to health care unaffected facili-
ties.45 North Korea is widely believed to have conducted the operation.46
The following year, the British Attorney General noted, in the same speech in
which he disputed the existence of a rule of sovereignty, that “[a]cts like the tar-
geting of essential medical services are no less prohibited interventions, or even
44. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 17, at 318.
45. Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Fahey, WannaCry and the International Law of Cyberspace, JUST
SEC. (Dec. 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/XPR8-438R.
46. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, U.S. Accuses North Korea of Mounting WannaCry Cyberattack, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/JN3Z-BXHR; Wright, supra note 25; JAPAN, MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Press Conference by Foreign Press Secretary Norio Maruyama (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://perma.cc/ANP5-DMG6.
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armed attacks, when they are committed by cyber means.”47 Since WannaCry
directly affected the physical well-being of individuals in the United Kingdom, it
clearly amounted to a violation of sovereignty on that basis for those who, unlike
the UK, support a rule of sovereignty. Yet, it is less clear that the operation
amounted to prohibited intervention.
Although the attack was coercive in fact, WannaCry was not coercive vis-à-vis
the domaine réservé of health care. Rather, the operation was designed to secure
a ransom payment; albeit highly disruptive, it did not deprive the United
Kingdom of the ability to exercise control over health care in the country, nor did
it affect its will with regard to health care choices that North Korea wished to
impose on the United Kingdom. In that sense, it differed from the COVID-19
operations, which dispossessed the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom of
the ability to execute specific elements of their crisis management plans to deal
with the pandemic, and were designed to do so.
As this example illustrates, the prohibition on intervention does not suffice to
fully compensate for the United Kingdom’s claimed lack of a rule of sover-
eignty.48 The prohibition of intervention is, at least under the mainstream view of
the rule, bound up in considerations of the intervening state’s intent, which the
mere production of adverse effects on health care or any other matter might not
trigger.
C. Violation of the Prohibition on the Use of Force
A third possible internationally wrongful act with respect to state cyber opera-
tions targeting medical and public health activities, facilities and capabilities in
another state during the pandemic is the unlawful use of force in violation of
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and its customary international law counterpart.49
In the cyber context, the troublesome issue has always been determining the crite-
ria for characterizing a cyber operation as a use of force.50 Yet, general consensus
exists that cyber operations causing significant damage, destruction, injury, or
death qualify.51 Therefore, any cyber operations attributable to a state mounted
into another state that can be causally linked directly to multiple deaths or lead to
a significant increase in COVID-19 infection rates would likely be considered a
use of force. Of course, at a certain point the causal nexus would be too attenuated
47. Wright, supra note 25. Wright cited Article 2(7) of the UN Charter as a basis for the prohibition
on intervention. It is not, for the article deals with intervention by the United Nations, not by states. The
prohibition on intervention as it applies to states is grounded in customary international law.
48. On the relationship between sovereignty and intervention, see Harriet Moynihan, The Application
of International Law to State Cyberattacks: Sovereignty and Non-intervention, CHATHAM HOUSE, 48-52
(Dec. 2019), https://perma.cc/L5WA-FWYS.
49. U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
50. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, The Use of Cyber Force and International Law, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1110 (Marc Weller ed. 2015).
51. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, International Law in
Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference
(Sept. 18, 2002), reprinted in 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1, 4 (2012).
258 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 11:247
to amount to a breach. But any cyber operation in which these consequences are
the foreseeable effect of the cyber operation would rise to the level of a use of
force.
At the extreme end of the harmful effects spectrum, such a cyber operation
could qualify not only as a use of force but also as an “armed attack” in the sense
of Article 51 of the Charter, which the International Court of Justice has labeled
the “gravest form” of use of force, one that entitles the victim state to self-
defense.52 The Court’s position is the mainstream view in the, majority view in
the legal literature. Importantly, however, the United States has argued that there
is no difference between a wrongful use of force and an armed attack. Therefore,
it reserves the right to use cyber or kinetic force in response to any cyber opera-
tion against the health sector that qualifies as a use of force.53
Two possible objections could be envisaged against this line of argument.
First, it could be asserted that the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force is
subject to a de minimis gravity threshold of the kind that applies, in the estimation
of most states and scholars, to the Article 51 notion of armed attack, if at a lower
level of intensity. Thus, for example, it has been disputed in the literature whether
smaller scale incidents, including the targeted killings by states of single (private)
individuals, qualify as uses of force.54 A prominent recent example in that regard
was the 2018 attempted assassination of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, allegedly by
Russian state agents using a potent nerve agent, in Salisbury, England. That inci-
dent was, in fact, qualified by the British Prime Minister as a use of force by
Russia against the UK (although she did not qualify it as an armed attack).55 In
our view, setting a de minimis threshold for Article 2(4) would be problematic
and difficult to do in a non-arbitrary fashion.56 And even if such a threshold
existed, a cyber operation that directly led to multiple deaths would almost cer-
tainly cross it.
The second objection is more conceptual, even philosophical—that the rele-
vant cyber operation was not a use of force because it did not cause any deaths.
The cause of the deaths was the virus, which the state using the cyber operation
did not introduce into the community. What that state did was simply to prevent
52. U.N. Charter art. 51; Nicaragua, supra note 40, at ¶191.
53. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, LAW OF WAR MANUAL §16.3.3.1. See
also Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and the Use of Force, 82 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 420,
422 (1988); Koh, supra note 51, at 4.
54. See, e.g., OLIVIER CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR 52 (2010); Independent International Fact-
Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, Vol. II, at 242, fn. 49 (2009), https://perma.cc/
6KEU-UB7M.
55. See Theresa May, Prime Minister, United Kingdom, Commons Statement on Salisbury Incident
(Mar. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/76L5-5CVP. See also Tom Ruys, “License to Kill” in Salisbury:
State-Sponsored Assassinations and the Jus ad Bellum, JUST SEC. (Mar. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/
KHL6-MHJV; Dapo Akande, The Use of Nerve Agents in Salisbury: Why does it Matter Whether it
Amounts to a Use of Force in International Law?, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/
QM2Z-AQTQ.
56. See generally Tom Ruys, The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus ad Bellum: Are
“Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2(4)?, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 159 (2014).
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the victim state from managing the effects of the epidemic on its territory. And it
is difficult, if not impossible, to prove that absent the cyber operation the territo-
rial state would in fact have prevented infections or that any specific person
would have survived COVID-19.
There is some force to this objection—preventing a state from managing an in-
fectious disease on its territory is not exactly equivalent to introducing such a dis-
ease to that territory. But while the effects of the cyber operation on deaths and
health might be difficult to establish with precision, if they are of a significant
magnitude or if a malicious intent on the part of the state engaging in the cyber
operation can be inferred, the causality concerns would not, in our view, be such
to exclude the possibility that there was a use of force prohibited by Article 2
(4).57
Even if a cyber operation does not directly contribute to an increased incidence
in COVID-19 infections and deaths, it could still potentially qualify as a use of
force. As with a violation of sovereignty, relatively permanent interferences with
the functioning of cyberinfrastructure and equipment upon which it depends is
generally considered damage for the purpose of the prohibition on the use of
force, since the “effect” is comparable to that which would be considered a use of
force if caused by non-cyber means.58 For instance, a cyber operation that
required the replacement of a significant amount of medical equipment would
qualify on that basis, even if no significant harm befell individuals who relied
upon the equipment for treatment and care, thanks to redundant systems that the
territorial state had in place.
As with the obligation to respect the sovereignty of other states, the precise
threshold at which a cyber operation that does not result in significant damage,
destruction, injury, or death reaches the level of a use of force remains unsettled
in international law. The emerging approach seems to consider a variety of fac-
tors in making that assessment. They include, inter alia, the severity of the conse-
quences, the invasiveness of the operation, the measurability of the effects, the
causal directness of the operation, and the entity that mounted the operation.59
57. To use a criminal law analogy, if person A sees person B drowning and reaching for a lifebelt,
and A then kicks the lifebelt away with the intention that B shall die, we would have no problem in
saying that A murdered B even if he did not put B in that life-jeopardizing situation in the first place. We
are grateful to Di Birch, Paul Roberts, and Matt Thomason for a discussion on this point.
58. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 17, at 7; Netherlands MFA Letter Appendix, supra note 27, at
3-4.
59. See, e.g., Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, supra note 27, at 7 (“In the absence of physical
damage, a cyberoperation may be deemed a use of force against the yardstick of several criteria,
including the circumstances prevailing at the time of the operation, such as the origin of the operation
and the nature of the instigator (military or not), the extent of intrusion, the actual or intended effects of
the operation or the nature of the intended target.”); Netherlands MFA Letter Appendix, supra note 27,
at 29 (“It is necessary . . . to examine both qualitative and quantitative factors. The Tallinn Manual 2.0
refers to a number of factors that could play a role in this regard, including how serious and far-reaching
the cyber operation’s consequences are, whether the operation is military in nature and whether it is
carried out by a state.”); and Koh, supra note 51, at 4 (“In assessing whether an event constituted a use
of force in or through cyberspace, we must evaluate factors including the context of the event, the actor
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Given the scale and effects of the pandemic, it is likely that states will look favor-
ably on characterizing cyber operations against the health sector as uses of force
even if those operations fall short of causing death or aggravation of illness on a
widespread scale. For instance, an operation that shut down a large hospital or
that interfered in a significant and direct manner with the distribution of essential
public health information could well be styled by states as a use of force, even if
it did not cause direct harm to human lives or health or permanently interfere
with infrastructure or equipment.
D. Violation of Human Rights
The violations of the rules of general international law that we have examined
above conceptualize the malicious state cyber operation as a violation of the
rights of the victim state. But such operations also potentially implicate the rights
that individuals hold directly under international law, without state mediation.
After all, the primary harm that such operations cause is to human life and health,
even if the violation is legally cast as an infringement on state sovereignty, or as a
breach of the prohibitions of intervention or the use of force. It is appropriate to
examine such operations from the standpoint of international human rights law
because “the same rights that people have offline must also be protected
online.”60
The human rights to life and health are protected by numerous universal and
regional human rights treaties; importantly, the right to life is non-derogable.61
Under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”62 Similarly,
under Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physi-
cal and mental health.”63 Not only do these treaties enjoy widespread acceptance,
but the rights to life and health have also been authoritatively held to form part of
customary international law.64
perpetrating the action (recognizing challenging issues of attribution in cyberspace), the target and
location, effects and intent, among other possible issues.). See also TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note
17, r. 69, and accompanying commentary.
60. U.N. Human Rights Council, Resolution 32/13 (The promotion, protection and enjoyment of
human rights on the Internet), ¶1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/32/13 (July 18, 2016).
61. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]. On derogations from the ICCPR, see Human Rights Committee, Statement on
Derogations from the Covenant in Connection with the COVID-19 Pandemic, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/128/2
(Apr. 24, 2020).
62. ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 6.
63. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
64. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24, ¶8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add.6, P 17 (Nov. 4, 1994); see also Christof Heyns, Dapo Akande, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, &
Thompson Chengeta, The International Legal Framework Regulating Armed Drones, 65 INT’L COMP. L.
Q. 791, 819 (2016).
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States have an array of negative and positive obligations under both rights. In
particular, they have the negative obligation to respect the rights, which is an
obligation of restraint, that is, it means that states should not, without adequate
justification, engage in activities that adversely affect them. In the right-to-life
context, the negative obligation has traditionally revolved around the prohibition
of an arbitrary deprivation of life, specifically through the use of lethal or poten-
tially lethal force by state agents, as in the policing context.
That context is not directly comparable to hostile cyber operations that increase
the risk of exposure to the virus during the pandemic or that decrease the avail-
ability of treatment. There is to our knowledge no exact analogue to this scenario
in existing human rights jurisprudence, particularly with regard to the question of
whether such an operation can entail a deprivation of life, a concept that implic-
itly includes various considerations of causality. On the one hand, it would seem
manifest that if a state deliberately infected an individual with a potentially lethal
virus, that would count as a deprivation of life—just as if it poisoned that individ-
ual with a potentially (but not inevitably) lethal nerve agent, as in the Skripal inci-
dent. On the other, if a state, through a hostile cyber operation, knowingly and
intentionally increased the risk that a population would be exposed to infection,
or denied them effective treatment, we see no material legal or moral difference
to the deliberate-infection scenario.
The Human Rights Committee, the treaty body established by the ICCPR, has
consistently held that the right to life “should not be interpreted narrowly.”65 It
has also held that a “[d]eprivation of life involves an intentional or otherwise
foreseeable and preventable life-terminating harm or injury, caused by an act or
omission. It goes beyond injury to bodily or mental integrity or threat thereto.”66
While acknowledging the absence of examples in existing jurisprudence that are
precisely analogous to a cyber operation that affects a state’s ability to combat a
pandemic, we do not consider it to be too much of a stretch to suggest that such
operations may constitute deprivations of life, even if the immediately proximate
cause of any death would be the coronavirus and not the cyber operation itself.
Moreover, such deprivations of life would necessarily be arbitrary, for there is no
conceivable legitimate justification that a state could offer for causing them.
The foregoing analysis applies even more readily to the human right to health.
The obligation to respect that right “requires States to refrain from interfering
directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to health.”67 Hostile cyber
operations that disrupt individuals’ access to health care, or more generally a
state’s ability to mitigate the effects of a pandemic, would easily run afoul of that
prohibition, which contains no threshold criterion such as the deprivation of life.
65. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 6, ¶1, U.N. Doc. CCPR: 30/04/1982 (Apr. 30,
1982); Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 36, ¶3, CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018).
66. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 36, ¶6, CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018).
67. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14, ¶33, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/
2000/4 (2000) [hereinafter CESCR General Comment No. 14].
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However, a controversial threshold issue when asserting that such state cyber
operations constitute a violation of human rights is extraterritoriality. The ques-
tion is whether states owe human rights obligations to individuals located outside
their sovereign territory, and, if so, in what circumstances.68 This issue has been
particularly contentious with respect to kinetic and detention operations during
armed conflict, with some states, foremost among them the United States, resist-
ing any attempts at the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties (con-
sider drone strikes or the preventive detention of terrorists in Guantánamo).69
And it is one that has direct bearing on whether the cyber operations attributable
to states that have targeted health facilities and capabilities, and public health
activities, in other states violate the human rights of affected individuals at all.
Many human rights treaties, among them the ICCPR, use the notion of state ju-
risdiction to delineate their scope of application.70 Human rights courts and treaty
bodies have interpreted that notion in two basic ways—as state control over a ter-
ritory in which the victim of the human rights violation is located (the spatial con-
ception or model of jurisdiction), or as state authority, power or control over the
victim directly, exercised by one of the state’s agents (the personal conception or
model of jurisdiction).71 Yet some treaties, like the ICESCR, contain no such ju-
risdiction clause. It is even less clear how customary human rights law applies
extraterritorially, although arguably “[i]n its customary form, at least the negative
obligation not arbitrarily to deprive someone of their life appears not to be limited
to application within a State’s territory.”72
One of us (Milanovic) has long advocated for an expansive and factual
approach to the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, arguing in par-
ticular that the negative obligation to respect human rights should be territorially
unrestricted.73 Thus, for example, even in the cyber surveillance context involving
no direct harm to life or health, the right to privacy would apply extraterritorially,
68. In support of extraterritorial applicability, see Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) 2004 ICJ 136, ¶111 (ICCPR) and ¶112
(ICESCR); Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, ¶10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.
13 (May 26, 2004); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 24, ¶27, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/GC/24 (2017).
69. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article
40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of
America, ¶10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006).
70. Thus, under Article 2(1) of the ICCPR, “[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant,” while under Article 1 ECHR “[t]he High Contracting Parties shall
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this
Convention.” European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art.
1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1953) [hereinafter ECHR].
71. See generally MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES 127-208 (2011). The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is both the most
varied and the most restrictive in its approach to extraterritorial application, whereas the case law of
other human rights bodies tends to be more generous.
72. Heyns et al., supra note 64, at 823.
73. MILANOVIC, supra note 71, at 209 et seq.
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and the state engaging in such operations would need to justify any interferences
with privacy.74 The other (Schmitt) concurs with the approach when applied to
customary human rights obligations, but is somewhat hesitant to apply it to human
rights treaties, preferring a case-by-case approach to their extraterritorial applica-
tion. Both of us agree, however, that an expansive view of the extraterritorial
application of human rights obligations is both desirable and sensible.
Of course, it is possible to hold reasonably different views about how jurisdiction
clauses in human rights treaties are to be interpreted, and more so about the extrater-
ritorial applicability of customary human rights law.75 That said, it is worth briefly
considering how human rights bodies would apply existing extraterritoriality case
law to malicious cyber operations against health care systems in other countries.
Beginning with the most restrictive approach, the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) held in Bankovic that even dropping a bomb on an individual in
an area outside a state’s control is insufficient to create a jurisdictional link for
the purpose of the right to life.76 By that logic, a cyber operation that directly (let
alone indirectly) resulted in death would not suffice to create such a link.77 Thus,
if a case were litigated against a European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
state party on a claim of malicious extraterritorial cyber operation targeting the
health sector, the Court would have to radically depart from some of its existing
case law to find that the operation falls within the Convention’s scope.78
The Human Rights Committee has not been as restrictive as the ECtHR. In its
recent General Comment No. 36 on the right to life, it embraced a very broad,
functional theory of the extraterritorial application of the right.79 The Committee
thus held that the notion of state jurisdiction in Article 2(1) ICCPR encompasses
“all persons over whose enjoyment of the right to life [the state] exercises power
or effective control. This includes persons located outside any territory effec-
tively controlled by the State, whose right to life is nonetheless impacted by its
74. See Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital
Age, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 81 (2015).
75. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman, The United States’ Long (and Proud) Tradition in Support of the
Extraterritorial Application of International Human Rights Law, JUST SEC. (Mar. 10, 2014), https://
perma.cc/3LA8-BBBE.
76. Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶74-82.
77. See U.K. Investigatory Powers Trib., Human Rights Watch Inc. & Ors v. Secretary of State for
the Foreign & Commonwealth Office & Ors, [2016] UKIP Trib 15_165-CH (16 May 2016) (ruling that
the ECHR did not apply to electronic surveillance activities of the UK government abroad, and
expressly relying on an analogy to Bankovic in doing so).
78. The Court’s current leading case on extraterritoriality is Al-Skeini and Others v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R., in which the Court partly departed from Bankovic
without overruling it, and in which it affirmed the spatial and personal conceptions of jurisdiction. The
Court most recently affirmed Bankovic in M.N. & Others v. Belgium, App. No. 3599/18, 2020-V Eur.
Ct. H.R. The Court has yet to rule directly in a case that concerns the extraterritorial applicability of the
ECHR to electronic surveillance or cyber operations; in its most recent surveillance cases that issue was
raised, but the Court managed to avoid it. See Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom,
App. No. 58170/13, 2018-IX Eur. Ct. H.R.
79. See also Heyns et al, supra note 64, at 823-25.
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military or other activities in a direct and reasonably foreseeable manner.”80 The
Committee thus moved away from a jurisdictional paradigm of state control over
the victim to that of state control over the victim’s enjoyment of their rights. It
seems reasonably clear that a hostile cyber operation against health care systems
during the pandemic could be an exercise of power over the affected individuals’
enjoyment of the right to life, and that such operations would adversely impact
the exercise of the right to life in a direct and reasonably foreseeable manner.
As for the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in 2000 it
opined that “States parties have to respect the enjoyment of the right to health in
other countries.”81 Nearly two decades later, the Committee further explained
that because the ICESCR lacks a clause limiting its extraterritorial application, its
provisions are not subject to any such kind of threshold restriction, jurisdictional
or otherwise.82 In particular, the Committee’s position is that:
The extraterritorial obligation to respect requires States parties to refrain from
interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the Covenant rights by
persons outside their territories. As part of that obligation, States parties must
ensure that they do not obstruct another State from complying with its obliga-
tions under the Covenant.83
Again, if this is the relevant legal standard—which is tantamount to arguing
that negative obligations under the ICESCR are not subject to any territorial limi-
tation—then any hostile cyber operation by a state that adversely affects the
health of individuals in another state during the pandemic would be within the
scope of the treaty,84 and would almost inevitably violate it.
To conclude, in our estimation state cyber operations that directly or indirectly
harm human life and health can properly be characterized as violations of treaty
and customary international human rights law. This should be an uncontroversial
proposition for operations affecting individuals within the state’s own territory,
but it is a more complex one when such operations are deployed extraterritorially.
Normatively, it is hard to understand why a state’s negative obligation to respect
the rights to life and health should not apply outside that state’s territory. As the
Human Rights Committee put it, “it would be unconscionable to so interpret the
responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpe-
trate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations
it could not perpetrate on its own territory.”85 The relevance of human rights,
80. HRC General Comment No. 36, supra note 65, ¶63 (emphasis added).
81. CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 67, ¶39.
82. CESCR General Comment No. 24, supra note 68, ¶27.
83. Id. ¶29.
84. See also Olivier De Schutter et al., Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial
Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 34 HUM. RGTS. Q. 1084,
1126-31 (2012).
85. Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No. R.12/52, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) at
176 (1981), ¶12.3.
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both symbolic and practical, should not be underplayed in situations in which a
state is causing harm primarily to human beings, as opposed to other states as
abstract entities. Human rights law is in many ways normatively a better fit for
describing the nature of the wrongdoing in question than are the state-oriented
rules on sovereignty, non-intervention, or use of force.86
II. STATE MISINFORMATION DURING THE PANDEMIC
The COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by extensive misinforma-
tion87 produced by both states and non-state actors—a veritable infodemic that
spreads infectiously over social media. This has ranged widely. For instance, mis-
information during the pandemic has included attempts to minimize the infectiv-
ity or virulence of the disease, the promotion of false and potentially even lethal
“cures” for the virus, and conspiracy theories about the origins of the virus and its
(nonexistent) relationship with 5G phone masts.88
Our focus in this Part will be on evaluating state misinformation during the
pandemic, that is, misinformation that originated with and/or is being spread by
persons whose conduct is attributable to the state. We will deal with misinforma-
tion by non-state actors in Part III. It is of course perfectly possible—and com-
monplace—for misinformation to originate with private individuals or organized
non-state actors, but then be picked up and amplified by state actors (and vice
versa). For example, the 5G conspiracy theories appear to have originated organi-
cally or spontaneously, only to be amplified by state actors (and some unfortunate
celebrities).89 Such state-amplified misinformation is legally no different from
misinformation that originated with the state.
With regard to its target audience, state misinformation can be projected inter-
nally against the state’s own population or externally against the population of
another state, or both. Its purposes can be wide-ranging. For example, a state
might conduct extraterritorial disinformation operations targeting an adversary to
sow discontent and dissent, as was described above, while misinformation
appears to have been deployed internally during the COVID-19 crisis by govern-
ments to project a sense of power, authority, and competence; to blame some
other actor for the state’s missteps in addressing the pandemic; or simply as a
86. Marko Milanovic, The Salisbury Attack: Don’t Forget Human Rights, EJIL: TALK!, (Mar. 15,
2018), https://perma.cc/C7XE-QTYF.
87. We define misinformation as any false item of information that is directly or indirectly relevant to
the pandemic. One can also speak of disinformation, a term that implies intentionality on the part of the
originator or the spreader of false information. We prefer to use misinformation as a broader term, and
will discuss the intentional spreading of misinformation in due course.
88. For a comprehensive overview, see List of Known Misinformation and Disinformation Regarding
Corona Virus in Social Media, CTR FOR INFORMED DEMOCRACY & SOCIAL-CYBERSECURITY, (2020),
https://perma.cc/92K9-PT9H.
89. See Ryan Gallagher, 5G Virus Conspiracy Theory Fueled by Coordinated Effort, BLOOMBERG
(Apr. 9, 2020, 7:04 AM), https://perma.cc/9F4A-GE49; James Temperton, How the 5G Coronavirus
Conspiracy Theory Tore Through the Internet, WIRED (Apr. 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/N648-EWTD.
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convenient distraction.90 And states can complement misinformation with direct
and indirect forms of censorship to hinder efforts to correct the state’s false narra-
tives. This is a well-worn playbook for authoritarian regimes.
State misinformation can be analysed from three perspectives: 1) as a violation
of human rights law when directed against a state’s own population; 2) as a viola-
tion of human rights law when directed against the populations of other states;
and 3) as a violation of sovereignty and the prohibition of intervention when
directed against other states. We will address each in turn.
A. Violation of Human Rights Law When Directed Against A State’s
Own Population
State misinformation directed against its own population can be especially
damaging during a pandemic. It inherently attracts more attention, and its impact
is inevitably amplified by the media. Such misinformation damages the informa-
tion ecosystem as a whole and destroys the public trust necessary for combatting
the pandemic. When employing direct and indirect forms of censorship in paral-
lel, state actors can construct, promote, and entrench entire false narratives by
simultaneously spreading misinformation and suppressing accurate information.
Because managing the coronavirus epidemic requires the population at large to
willingly adopt measures such as handwashing and social distancing, state misin-
formation that minimizes the threat posed by the virus is particularly harmful.
Examples range from downplaying the virulence or danger of COVID-19, as has
occurred in Brazil,91 to Nicaragua and Turkmenistan’s denials that the virus is
even present (or at least not being transmitted).92 The spread by state agents of
misinformation about specific medicines and treatments, for instance by promot-
ing ineffective or unproven treatments, is likewise dangerous.93 It is especially
problematic when coupled with the suppression of accurate information.94 There
is no question that such misinformation can directly place lives and health at risk.
90. See e.g., Julian Borger, Trump Scapegoating of WHO Obscures its Key Role in Tackling
Pandemic, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2020, 18:53), https://perma.cc/ZBM4-FHBJ; Lily Kuo, “American
coronavirus”: China Pushes Propaganda Casting Doubt on Virus Origin, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 12,
2020, 20:59), https://perma.cc/29S6-SEMP.
91. Ernesto Londo~no, Manuela Andreoni & Letı́cia Casado, Bolsonaro, Isolated and Defiant,
Dismisses Coronavirus Threat to Brazil, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/BNT7-DP8C;
Ishaan Tharoor, Brazil’s Bolsonaro Sits on a Ticking Coronavirus Time Bomb, WASH. POST (May 1,
2020, 12:00 AM), https://perma.cc/WMK4-6T9Y.
92. Abdujalil Abdurasulov, Coronavirus: Why has Turkmenistan Reported no Cases?, BBC NEWS
(Apr. 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/CSA3-6QWR; Wilfredo Miranda & Tom Phillips, President Nowhere
To Be Seen as Nicaragua Shuns Coronavirus Curbs, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2020, 12:17 EDT), https://
perma.cc/8WFW-QNMM.
93. For example, a herbal tonic being actively promoted by the president of Madagascar. Bukola
Adebayo, Amid WHO Warnings and with No Proof, Some African Nations Turn to Herbal Tonic to Try
to Treat Covid-19, CNN (May 15, 2020, 15:41 GMT), https://perma.cc/BQU7-G7LD.
94. Misinformation can come from local or regional authorities and still be attributable to the state as
a matter of international law; it need not emanate from central authorities or with their blessing. In that
regard, see Andrew Higgins, In Pandemic, a Remote Russian Region Orders a Lockdown on
Information, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/WH4K-DJBR (discussing the efforts of local
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From the international human rights law perspective, the characterization of
state misinformation depends primarily on the nature and magnitude of the social
harm that it causes, the directness of the causal nexus between the state’s infor-
mation and the harm, and the objectives of the relevant state agents who spread
the misinformation. Analysis is always highly contextual, but two broad conclu-
sions are possible.
First, state agents who systematically disseminate falsehoods may be denying
individuals’ right to seek and receive information by hindering their ability to
access accurate information, especially when states simultaneously suppress
accurate information. The right to seek and receive information is part and parcel
of the freedom of expression in international human rights law.95
Second, state agents who spread misinformation online that directly affects
health or exposes individuals to significantly elevated risks violate their state’s
obligations to respect and protect the rights to life and health, as guaranteed by
international human rights instruments. It is clear that the right to life extends to
“general conditions in society that may give rise to direct threats to life . . .
[including] the prevalence of life threatening diseases.”96 There is also no doubt
that in order to respect the right to health, states have to refrain “from censoring,
withholding or intentionally misrepresenting health-related information,” “take
measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases,” and “pro-
vide education and access to information concerning the main health problems in
the community.”97 The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights rightly observes that the “deliberate withholding or misrepresentation of
information vital to health protection or treatment” violates a state’s duty to
respect the right to health.98
In sum, state agents have a negative duty under human rights law to refrain
from spreading misinformation that harms human health. Such a duty will
clearly apply if the misinformation is being spread knowingly or deliberately.
B. Violation of Human Rights Law When Directed Against Individuals in
Other States
The foregoing analysis would apply with equal force to misinformation spread
by the state externally against the populations of other states. “The right to free-
dom of expression, which includes the right to seek, receive and impart informa-
tion and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, through any media, applies to
authorities in a Russian region to spread misinformation and suppress accurate information, with a local
activist being quoted as saying that “Putin is not sitting in a bunker telling everyone to hide the truth. . . .
Local officials lie because this is what they have always done. It is a habit.”).
95. ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 19; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, E.T.S. No. 5.
96. HRC General Comment No. 36, supra note 65, ¶26.
97. CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 67, ¶¶34, 44.
98. Id. ¶50 (emphasis added).
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everyone, everywhere.”99 Polluting the information space in another state is not
meaningfully different, either legally or morally, from doing the same thing on
one’s own territory. The same is true with respect to more direct harm to human
lives and health.
The difficulty that arises, however, is the issue of extraterritoriality examined
above. That analysis applies mutatis mutandis here. To the extent that the obliga-
tions implicated are negative duties of restraint, it matters not whether the harm
to human lives and health is caused by a cyber operation that, say, physically
makes COVID-19 testing impossible, or by a misinformation campaign that
fatally undermines public confidence in, and willingness to partake of, testing.
The extraterritoriality analysis is the same—if the former scenario falls within the
scope of application of human rights treaties, then so too does the latter. Simply
put, what matters is the extent of the misinformation operation’s causal contribu-
tion to the harm.
C. Violation of General International Law When Directed Against Other States
Finally, state misinformation operations directed against other states can also
violate the rules of general international law examined above. For instance, seem-
ingly reliable misinformation intended to convince individuals to prophylacti-
cally consume substances that make them ill or risk death would violate the
sovereignty of the state in which those effects manifested. Depending on the scale
of the sickness or death caused and the directness of the causal connection, a
cyber misinformation operation even could rise to the level of a use of force.
Somewhat less clear cut is the application of the principle of non-intervention
to misinformation attributable to a state. If misinformation directly causes part of
the target state’s crisis management plan to fail and was designed to do so, as in
falsely announcing that a particular hospital is no longer receiving COVID-19
patients or that testing at a certain location has ended, our view is that the coer-
civeness requirement is satisfied. Such actions would be analogous to undisputed
examples of intervention, like manipulating election machinery or altering a vote
count. They block a state’s ability to execute a plan with respect to its domaine
réservé.
But when the misinformation does not substantially deprive the target state of
the ability to manage the epidemic, it is less clear the action is coercive, as dis-
tinct from merely serving to influence the population. This is so even if the misin-
formation proves harmful. An example would be the dissemination of false or
misleading information about testing statistics or claims that public health meas-
ures should be relaxed. Such actions would be analogous to Russia’s hacking of
databases and the release to Wikileaks of emails of Hillary Clinton and others
involved in her campaign, and the spreading of false or misleading information
99. David Kaye, Harlem Désir & Edison Lanza, COVID-19: Governments Must Promote and
Protect Access to and Free Flow of Information During Pandemic – International Experts, U.N. HUMAN
RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Mar. 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/3SSU-8657.
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about her during the 2016 U.S. presidential elections. As noted, the point at which
influence becomes coercion remains unsettled in international law, but some acts
of misinformation would unambiguously qualify as prohibited intervention. Even
when they do not, it must be remembered that the misinformation might violate
the target state’s sovereignty on the basis of interfering with an inherently govern-
mental act.
III. STATE OBLIGATIONS REGARDING CYBER OPERATIONS AND MISINFORMATION BY
NON-STATE ACTORS AND THIRD STATES DURING THE PANDEMIC
Parts I and II examined how cyber and misinformation operations attributable
to a state can violate various rules of general international law and human rights
law. These were mainly negative obligations of restraint. In this Part, analysis
turns to the positive obligations that states have with regard to COVID-19-related
cyber and misinformation operations conducted by non-state actors and third
states. It focuses on three related issues: a state’s positive due diligence obligation
under human rights law to protect its own population against hostile operations;
the limits that international law imposes on such protective measures, particularly
with regard to the freedom of expression; and the positive due diligence obliga-
tions under general international law and human rights law to stop hostile opera-
tions against third states and their populations when such operations are
emanating from the state’s territory.
A. Positive Due Diligence Obligation under Human Rights Law to Protect the
State’s Own Population Against Hostile Operations by Other States and
by Non-State Actors
International human rights law requires states to protect (secure, ensure)
the human rights that individuals on their territory, or otherwise within their juris-
diction, enjoy, a principle set out, inter alia, in Article 2(1) ICCPR.”100 The obli-
gation to protect is one of due diligence, a duty of conduct, not of result. It does
not require states to prevent or stop all possible harm to life or health, but only to
take all feasible measures reasonably at their disposal.101 That duty extends to
harm caused by natural disasters, therefore, in the context of the pandemic, it
requires states to take feasible measures to protect their populations from the
virus.102
100. ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 2(1).
101. See Antonio Coco & Talita de Souza Dias, Part I: Due Diligence and COVID-19: States’ Duties
to Prevent and Halt the Coronavirus Outbreak, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/HQ3B-
EXST.
102. See, e.g., Öneryıldız v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶89-90, 97-110
(holding Turkey responsible for failing to protect the right to life because its state officials did not do
everything within their power to protect the inhabitants of a slum from the immediate and known risks to
which they were exposed as the result of an unsafe municipal garbage dump that suffered a methane
explosion, killing or injuring many individuals); M. Özel & Others v. Turkey, App. No. 14350/05, 2015-
XI Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶173-174 (duty to protect life exists even with regard to unexpected natural disasters
outside the state’s control, such as earthquakes).
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But the duty also applies to harm directly caused by third parties.103 As
explained by the Human Rights Committee,
the positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only
be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against
violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by
private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights
in so far as they are amenable to application between private persons or enti-
ties. There may be circumstances in which a failure to ensure Covenant rights
as required by article 2 would give rise to violations by States Parties of those
rights, as a result of States Parties’ permitting or failing to take appropriate
measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress
the harm caused by such acts by private persons or entities.104
Thus, the fact that the hostile cyber operations targeting medical facilities and
capabilities or public health activities may have been conducted by non-state
actors operating independently does not relieve states of the burden of taking
action to prevent them from placing individuals at risk, so long as the cyber oper-
ation in question affects a specific human right, such as the right to life or the right
to health. The same is true with respect to misinformation campaigns having
comparable effects.
The Human Rights Committee has applied this approach in the health context.
For instance, in its 2018 General Comment No. 36, the Committee noted that the
obligation to take measures to safeguard the right to life can require states to take
“appropriate measures to address the general conditions in society that may give
rise to direct threats to life,” including “life-threatening diseases.”105 Over three
decades earlier, it similarly had observed,
the right to life has been too often narrowly interpreted. The expression “inher-
ent right to life” cannot properly be understood in a restrictive manner, and the
protection of this right requires that States adopt positive measures. In this con-
nection, the Committee considers that it would be desirable for States parties
to take all possible measures to . . . adopt measures to eliminate . . .
epidemics.106
By this interpretation, with which we agree, states must, as a matter of law,
take all feasible measures, including by cyber means, to prevent and respond to
cyber operations that risk diminishing the ability of private or public health care
103. See, e.g., Velásquez Rodrı́guez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988), Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), 29 July 1988, ¶¶172-173 (the very first judgment of the
Inter-American Court, which for the first time in human rights jurisprudence elucidated the protective
due diligence obligation with regard to violations of the right to life perpetrated by third parties).
104. HRC General Comment No. 31, supra note 68, ¶8.
105. HRC General Comment No. 36, supra note 65, ¶26.
106. HRC General Comment No. 6, supra note 65, ¶5.
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facilities to treat COVID-19 patients, so long as such hostile operations are rea-
sonably foreseeable.107 This obligation arguably extends beyond those attacks
that directly interfere with the delivery of health care, as in a cyber operation that
obstructs the operation of ventilators or other critical medical equipment, to those
that hinder public health measures to fight the pandemic, like disruption of virus
testing. It must be emphasized that the obligation to protect the rights of individu-
als to whom the state owes human rights obligations also encompasses cyber
operations that are conducted by third states (and not just non-state actors) against
medical facilities and capabilities and public health activities.108
Overarching positive obligations also exist with regard to the right to health
and the freedom of expression. Thus, for example, the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights has held that states violate their positive obligation to
protect the right to health if they fail “to take all necessary measures to safeguard
persons within their jurisdiction from infringements of the right to health by third
parties.”109
Cumulatively, in the context of the pandemic, the positive duty to protect the
rights to life, health, and the freedom of expression entails the following concrete
steps, in addition to measures that states are taking to combat the virus itself:
 First, states must take all feasible measures to prevent hostile cyber
operations adversely affecting their health care systems and capaci-
ties when such operations are capable of causing harm to human life
or health or disrupting the state’s response to the pandemic. It is
irrelevant whether the malicious cyber operation is emanating from
a non-state actor or from another state.
 Second, states must take all feasible steps to promote accurate
COVID-19-related information and facilitate access to such
information.
 Third, in a very narrow category of cases—those with a clear causal
link to substantial harm or risk to human life or health—states have
a duty to suppress COVID-19-related misinformation, strictly sub-
ject to necessity and proportionality requirements for lawfully limit-
ing the freedom of expression. For example, the state would have
the duty to suppress speech that claims ingesting methanol is a cure
107. HRC General Comment No. 36, supra note 65, ¶¶7, 18, 21. See also Tagayeva & Others v.
Russia, App. No. 26562/07, 2017-IV Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶481-493 (holding Russia responsible for its
breach of the positive obligation to protect life with regard to the terrorist attack against a school in
Beslan, because Russian authorities had sufficiently specific information about the planned attack and
failed to take measures to prevent or mitigate the risk of the attack).
108. HRC General Comment No. 36, supra note 65, ¶22. See also El-Masri v. Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09, 2012-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. (holding Macedonia responsible for
failing to prevent, and for being complicit in, human rights violations perpetrated by U.S. agents on its
territory during an “extraordinary rendition” operation).
109. CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 67, ¶51.
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for COVID-19. And in a somewhat wider set of cases, states would
be permitted to suppress such misinformation (see discussion
below).
 Fourth, in that regard, states must take reasonable steps to regulate
and cooperate with corporate actors that manage digital platforms,
like social media companies, which host the vast bulk of online
expression by private individuals.
Indeed, even without state regulation, private actors such as social media plat-
forms are aggressively taking measures to curb COVID-19 misinformation, far
more so than with regard to political misinformation.110 Responses have ranged
from the promotion of accurate information from authoritative sources and noti-
ces flagging suspicious content, to taking down content or relegating it in search
results. The relevant policies of digital platforms are constantly evolving111 and
their moderation decisions have been quite granular. For example, YouTube is
removing videos promoting conspiracy theories about 5G networks and the coro-
navirus, but it is not taking down videos promoting other 5G conspiracies, choos-
ing instead not to include these in search results.112 Even WhatsApp, which
employs end-to-end encryption and thus cannot moderate content as such, has
introduced measures to slow down the spread of misinformation, such as limits
on the number of times a message can be forwarded.113 Analogously with efforts
to slow the spread of the pandemic, WhatsApp is trying to reduce the R0, or the
basic reproduction number, of the infodemic.
Although private entities are generally not directly bound by international
human rights law, through the acceptance of various soft initiatives such as the
Ruggie Principles,114 as well as in response to work by the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the Freedom of Expression (among others),115 a number of digital
platforms have acknowledged the need for more rigorous and transparent self-
regulation and a degree of state intervention. Crucially, they are increasingly
110. Evelyn Douek, COVID-19 and Social Media Content Moderation, LAWFARE (Mar. 25, 2020,
1:10 PM), https://perma.cc/TYJ6-8AZ2.
111. See, e.g., Yoel Roth & Nick Pickles, Updating our Approach to Misleading Information (May
11, 2020), https://perma.cc/87ST-JV3S (explaining the newest iteration of Twitter’s approach to
misinformation).
112. Alex Hern, YouTube Moves to Limit Spread of False Coronavirus 5G Theory, THE GUARDIAN
(Apr. 5, 2020, 10:57 EDT), https://perma.cc/2K5M-L4EG.
113. Alex Hern,WhatsApp to Impose New Limit on Forwarding to Fight Fake News, THE GUARDIAN
(Apr. 7, 2020, 3:00 EDT), https://perma.cc/6ZZR-3LMM.
114. John G. Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011).
115. David Kaye, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression (Online Content Regulation), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35 (Apr. 6,
2018).
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adopting international human rights law as a universal regulatory framework.
Facebook, for example, has done so explicitly.116
However, states shoulder a positive obligation under human rights law to
ensure that the companies’ approaches to online speech are appropriate, and that
the restrictions they impose on expression are not excessive. Major regulatory
decisions that potentially involve balancing competing human rights need to be
made by states, and subjected to public scrutiny. As the U.N. Special Rapporteur,
David Kaye, has explained, “the rules of speech for public space, in theory,
should be made by relevant political communities, not private companies that
lack democratic accountability and oversight.”117 In the wake of waves of misin-
formation affecting everything from elections to pandemic response, the increas-
ing regulatory activity of states is both inevitable and appropriate. For example,
Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Twitter have signed up to a recent EU regula-
tory regime.118 The private sector will therefore be increasingly guided by human
rights principles, including those set forth above, when determining how to
respond to the infodemic of COVID-19 misinformation.119
B. Constraints under Human Rights Law When Combatting Hostile Cyber
Operations and Misinformation
When taking measures to protect their populations from hostile cyber opera-
tions and misinformation, states must not unduly infringe on human rights, partic-
ularly the freedom of expression. They must, in other words, strike the right
balance between potentially competing rights and interests—a common occur-
rence within human rights law.120
Nevertheless, it would be a categorical error to view the freedom of expression
simply as a restriction on a state’s measures designed to protect its population
during the pandemic. Rather, the freedom of expression is essential for effec-
tively combating the pandemic. Unjustified suppression of speech can, like the
untrammeled dissemination of viral misinformation, lead to more deaths in the
long run. Recall the Chinese government’s censorship of the doctor who warned
116. Monika Bickert (Facebook), Charting a Way Forward: Online Content Regulation (Feb. 2020),
https://perma.cc/75XS-LVWU; Sejal Parmar, Facebook’s Oversight Board: A Meaningful Turn
Towards International Human Rights Standards?, JUST SEC. (May 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/JBP6-
XUJU.
117. David Kaye, A New Constitution for Content Moderation, ONEZERO (June 25, 2019), https://
perma.cc/W3F4-M97Y.
118. See the Code of Practice on Disinformation, which, inter alia, involves a self-reporting
obligation. Annual self-assessment reports of signatories to the Code of Practice on Disinformation
2019, EUROPEAN COMM’N, (Oct. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/HSD3-FG3D.
119. Kate Jones, Online Disinformation and Political Discourse Applying a Human Rights
Framework, CHATHAM HOUSE REPORT (Nov. 2019) https://perma.cc/K6A9-G78V.
120. Consider, for example, the need to strike a balance between protecting the freedom of
expression, on the one hand, and reputations, on the other, in the defamation context. See, e.g., Von
Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. (finding that Germany had
overprotected the freedom of expression of the press while underprotecting the right to the private life of
the applicant).
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of the virus’ spread121 and the imposition by the UK National Health Service of a
ban on NHS health professionals speaking out about workplace conditions.122
Such measures have only exacerbated the situation. And in countries around the
world, the important role of journalists and civil society as public watchdogs is
being demonstrated daily as government misinformation, errors, and lack of
resources in the health systems are exposed, not for the purpose of assigning
blame, but to ensure that they are rectified as quickly as possible.123
In short, when state efforts to combat pandemic-related hostile cyber opera-
tions or misinformation limit human rights, they must comply with the require-
ments of the relevant treaties, such as those found in Article 19 of the ICCPR and
Article 10 of the ECHR. The measures have to be prescribed by law, necessary to
pursue a specific legitimate aim, and be proportionate to that aim.124 Public health
is irrefutably one such aim.125 Specifically, suppression of misinformation can in
principle qualify as necessary for the protection of public health when the social
harm caused by untruthful speech cannot be effectively remedied by more truth-
ful speech. Clearly, that is sometimes the case with respect to the pandemic, for
the misinformation is proving highly effective and the propagation of accurate in-
formation has at times been unable to mitigate the harm. Finally, limitations must
always be proportionate in the sense of avoiding, to the extent possible, the poten-
tial harm that they could cause.
Three points are essential in this regard. First, and critically, untruthfulness is
not in itself a ground for suppressing expression. To be limitable, misinformation
has to directly contribute to social harm, which has to be of such magnitude that
there is a “pressing social need” (to use the parlance of the European Court) to
restrict such expression.126 The engagement of human rights bodies with so-
called “memory laws,” which can range from criminalizing the denial of specific
historical facts or atrocities, like the Holocaust, to punishing any negation of an
overarching historical narrative, is instructive.127 Painting with a very broad
brush, human rights bodies have accepted such measures only if the
121. Li Wenliang: Coronavirus Kills Chinese Whistleblower Doctor, BBC NEWS (Feb. 7, 2020),
https://perma.cc/6UNX-5ZF2. Such censorship appears to be continuing. Stephanie Kirchgaessner,
Emma Graham-Harrison & Lily Kuo, China Clamping Down on Coronavirus Research, Deleted Pages
Suggest, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 11, 2020, 8:33), https://perma.cc/3P5V-BXME.
122. Sarah Johnson, NHS Staff Forbidden from Speaking out Publicly about Coronavirus, THE
GUARDIAN (Apr. 9, 2020, 3:56 EDT), https://perma.cc/KB9W-TLY8.
123. Yasmeen Abutaleb, Josh Dawsey, Ellen Nakashima & Greg Miller, The U.S. was Beset by
Denial and Dysfunction as the Coronavirus Raged, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/ZNS9-
N53T.
124. ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 19(3); ECHR, supra note 70, art. 10(2). See also TALLINN MANUAL
2.0, supra note 17, r. 37, and accompanying commentary.
125. See ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 19(3), and ECHR, supra note 70, art. 10(2).
126. See, e.g., Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶39 (1986).
127. Alina Cherviatsova, Gravity of the Past: Polish-Ukrainian Memory War and Freedom of
Speech, EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/4D85-678E; Gleb Bogush & Ilya Nuzov,
Russia’s Supreme Court Rewrites History of the Second World War, EJIL: TALK! (Oct. 28, 2016),
https://perma.cc/AK77-WK69.
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misinformation, interpreted in its context, also constituted incitement to hatred or
intolerance.
For example, in the Faurisson case, the Human Rights Committee accepted
the justifiability of the applicant’s criminal prosecution for denying the existence
of gas chambers in Auschwitz, but did so solely because in the French context the
denial amounted to a “coded” expression of anti-Semitism.128 In General
Comment No. 34, the Committee added:
Laws that penalize the expression of opinions about historical facts are incom-
patible with the obligations that the Covenant imposes on States parties in rela-
tion to the respect for freedom of opinion and expression. The Covenant does
not permit general prohibition of expressions of an erroneous opinion or an
incorrect interpretation of past events.129
In short, human rights bodies demand substantial potential harm well beyond
mere untruthfulness to justify a state’s limitation of expression.
Second, even when limitations on false speech are necessary and proportionate
in principle in order to achieve a lawful end such as health, they must be cali-
brated to minimize any chilling effect on potentially beneficial speech.130 In the
context of the pandemic, such effects can be especially problematic vis-à-vis
medical matters regarding which expert consensus is divided, tentative, or lack-
ing. Recall how healthcare professionals initially were nearly unanimous in
advising against the personal use of face masks, only to reverse themselves in
light of new information.131 It is particularly important that restrictions on the dis-
semination of false information not impede such adjustments, as the health com-
munity’s understanding of a health threat and adequate responses thereto evolve.
Third, while “political” speech enjoys heightened protection, that category is
analytically imprecise. Yes, it is clear that under human rights case law “there is
little scope . . . for restrictions on political speech or on debate of questions of
public interest.”132 However, as illustrated by the divisiveness over the need to
social distance, originally apolitical issues can easily become politicized. This
has even occurred with regard to ostensibly technical matters like the figures for
individuals tested, available hospital beds or ventilators, and individuals who are
afflicted with the virus or have died as a result of contracting it.133 The mere fact
128. Communication No. 550/1993: France (Jurisprudence), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993
(1996) (Robert Faurisson v. France), ¶¶9.3-9.7, and separate opinion by Elizabeth Evatt, David
Kretzmer, and Eckart Klein.
129. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34, ¶49, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12,
2011).
130. Id. ¶47.
131. Recommendation Regarding the Use of Cloth Face Coverings, Especially in Areas of
Significant Community-Based Transmission, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 3, 2020
date last reviewed), https://perma.cc/A6QH-U35S.
132. Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶58 (1996).
133. See, e.g., Trump’s Claim That U.S. Tested More Than All Countries Combined Is ‘Pants On
Fire’ Wrong, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/JG9D-3JLR.
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that it is a politicianwho engages in COVID-19 misinformation, offline or online,
does not mean that such speech can never be limited. Unlike First Amendment
doctrine,134 international human rights law does not categorically ban content or
viewpoint-based restrictions on political speech.
Given the aforementioned limitations on a state’s ability to ban COVID-19
misinformation, the question becomes what states may lawfully do to address the
infodemic. Some have adopted new legislation, repurposed old legislation, or
implemented other measures to combat the spread of misinformation in gen-
eral.135 In the face of the pandemic, some states are applying these pre-existing
measures to COVID-19-related misinformation. Others, however, have adopted
sweeping solutions that have been criticized for their over-breadth.136 The
Council of Europe’s Commissioner on Human Rights has thus felt compelled to
urge member states “to preserve press and media freedom and ensure that meas-
ures to combat disinformation are necessary, proportionate and subject to regular
oversight, including by Parliament and national human rights institutions.”137 To
that caution we can add several broad conclusions.
First, laws that contain blanket bans on misinformation or untruthful speech
that are not narrowly tailored to achieve a particular legitimate aim fail the neces-
sity and proportionality tests under human rights law, and accordingly unduly
infringe on the freedom of expression. As noted in the 2017 Joint Declaration of
Special Mandates on the Freedom of Expression, “[g]eneral prohibitions on the
dissemination of information based on vague and ambiguous ideas, including
‘false news’ or ‘non-objective information,’ are incompatible with international
standards for restrictions on freedom of expression . . . and should be
abolished.”138
Second, since the impact of pandemic misinformation varies from country to
country, the permissible restrictions on expression under international human
rights law will equally be context-specific. Where misinformation is proving
effective, greater expression-restricting measures may be justified. By contrast, in
a state with robust online and offline sources of information, it might be possible
134. Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, HARVARD UNIV., HARVARD KENNEDY
SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, FACULTY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER SERIES (Feb. 2005), https://perma.cc/
UR7F-W2AG.
135. See, e.g., Singapore invokes ’fake news’ law for first time over Facebook post, THE GUARDIAN
(Nov. 25, 2019, 4:50 EST), https://perma.cc/5Y28-85NC.
136. See, e.g., Mu Sochua, Coronavirus ‘Fake News’ Arrests Are Quieting Critics, FOREIGN POLICY
(May 22, 2020, 9:23 AM), https://perma.cc/95JS-PV2A.
137. Press Freedom must not be Undermined by Measures to Counter Disinformation about COVID-
19, COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, (Apr. 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/64YG-
FU45.
138. The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media,
the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, and the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression and Access to Information, Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News,”
Disinformation and Propaganda, ¶2A (Mar. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/4MGV-VWCE.
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to counter misinformation by other methods, especially through the efforts of the
government and other authoritative institutions that can promote accurate infor-
mation, without imposing significant restrictions.
Third, the imposition of criminal penalties on those who engage in the spread-
ing of misinformation, online or offline, is unlikely to satisfy the proportionality
test if the state failed to carefully adopt measures calibrated to its own context
and the threat it is facing, and where less restrictive measures were available but
not tested. Such penalties could suggest that their purpose was not to combat the
virus, but rather to silence criticism of the government more generally, as has
been the case with a number of authoritarian regimes.139
Therefore, penalties of this nature are per se illegitimate under human rights
law because they are not actually pursuing the legitimate aim of protecting public
health. Criminalization of misinformation is only appropriate in the most excep-
tional of cases, through laws that contain a precise definition of the social harm
caused by untruthful speech and require proof of a high standard of mens rea. An
example would be criminalizing the dissemination of misinformation about
methanol or other substances as a cure for COVID-19 knowing that the informa-
tion is false and knowing the health risks of ingesting the substance. The more re-
pressive a measure is, the more it needs to be used surgically, and only when a
less restrictive measure would be ineffective.140
The same analysis would apply to a state’s shutdown of internet services.141 In
particular, the harm caused by a shutdown would almost certainly be dispropor-
tionate, for it would impede the freedom of online expression completely in the
targeted areas. It is difficult to fashion a scenario in which such an action would
be justified for the purpose of combating COVID-19 misinformation, for access
to online information is essential to combating, and recovering from, the pan-
demic. Consider, as an example, the adverse effects that the ban on high-speed
Internet access that the Indian government has imposed in Kashmir has had on
the availability of COVID-19 information.142 Freedom of expression necessarily
139. Florian Bieber, Authoritarianism in the Time of the Coronavirus, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 30,
2020, 10:30 AM), https://perma.cc/HDZ3-GVPC; Csaba Gyo†ry, Fighting Fake News or Fighting
Inconvenient Truths?, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Apr. 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/92H5-FYF5; Todd Prince,
Russian Activist Says She’s Hit By First Investigation Under ’Fake’ Coronavirus News Law, RADIO
FREE EUROPE (Apr. 05, 2020 7:12 GMT), https://perma.cc/TF9B-3LGX.
140. A reasonably tailored example of a criminal law that could satisfy the necessity and
proportionality tests – depending on how it is applied in practice – is the penal legislation adopted by
South Africa that criminalizes publishing a statement through any medium with the intention to deceive
about Covid-19, anyone’s Covid-19 infection status or government measures to address the pandemic.
The “intention to deceive” mens rea standard is an appropriately high one. See Dario Milo & Johan
Thiel, South Africa: Fake News About Covid-19 Now a Criminal Offence, INFORRM’S BLOG (Mar. 22,
2020), https://perma.cc/WS5G-XAL4.
141. David Kaye, Report of the Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights Council on Disease
Pandemics and the Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/44/49 (Apr. 23, 2020),
¶¶24-29.
142. Niala Mohammad, High-Speed Internet Ban Keeps Kashmir in Dark, Journalists Say, VOICE OF
AMERICA (May 13, 2020, 6:11 PM), https://perma.cc/Y3YG-Z7AZ; Ahmer Khan & Billy Perrigo,What
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includes the right to access the Internet as a general matter, so long as such access
is available.143
Finally, it is interesting to observe how some digital platforms have assumed
the role of human rights protectors against state misinformation. For instance,
Facebook and Twitter have taken down posts by national leaders that disseminate
certain misinformation, such as the uncritical promotion of the use of hydroxy-
chloroquine.144 In doing so, companies can rely on international human rights
law to resist unjustified state demands to remove content. As noted by U.N.
Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Expression David Kaye, “[i]t is much less
convincing to say to authoritarians, ‘We cannot take down that content because
that would be inconsistent with our rules,’ than it is to say, ‘Taking down that
content would be inconsistent with the international human rights our users enjoy
and []which your government is obligated to uphold.’”145
C. Positive Due Diligence Obligation under General International Law and
Human Rights Law to Stop Hostile Operations Against Other States
The discussion has thus far examined the state’s duty of protection against ma-
licious cyber and misinformation operations that target its own population. But
the question remains whether such a protective duty can also arise when such
operations are emanating from or transiting through a state’s territory while
affecting third states. We submit that the answer is Yes on two bases. First, such a
due diligence obligation arises under general international law. Second, and more
contestably, it may also arise under human rights law.
With regard to the former, states are bound in our view by the obligation of due
diligence to terminate cyber operations launched from or through their territory
that have serious adverse consequences with respect to the rights under interna-
tional law of other states.146 This obligation extends to taking action to stop such
cyber operations, whether conducted by states or non-state actors. To the extent
that the hostile cyber operation in question would have constituted an internation-
ally wrongful act (such as violation of sovereignty, intervention, or a use of force)
Life Is Like Inside the World’s Longest Lockdown, TIME (May 5, 2020, 10:30 PM EDT), https://perma.
cc/67CA-QAJT.
143. Kaye, Désir & Lanza, supra note 99.
144. Coronavirus: World Leaders’ Posts Deleted Over Fake News, BBC NEWS (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://perma.cc/H55Q-NAGX.
145. Kaye, A New Constitution, supra note 117.
146. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 17, ch. 2. See also S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 10, at 88 (Sept. 7); Island of Palmas (Neth. v. US), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 839 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1928); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 22 (Apr. 9). Although it has not confirmed its
acceptance of due diligence as a binding rule of law yet, Australia has highlighted the conditions for
its applicability: “To the extent that a state enjoys . . . sovereignty over objects and activities within its
territory, it necessarily shoulders corresponding responsibilities to ensure [they] are not used to harm
other states . . . .[It] may not be reasonable to expect (or even possible for) a state to prevent all
malicious use of ICT infrastructure . . . . However, . . . if a state is aware of an internationally wrongful
act originating from or routed through its territory, and it has the ability to put an end to the harmful
activity, that state should take reasonable steps to do so consistent with international law.” Australia,
International Cyber Engagement Strategy 91 (2017).
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had the territorial state conducted it, that state must take feasible measures to put
an end to any ongoing operations from or through cyber infrastructure on its terri-
tory targeting activities addressing the crisis in other states.
There is no reason to exclude application of the rule to hostile cyber operations
against medical facilities or capabilities, or public health activities. Before the
obligation attaches, however, the hostile cyber operation must have serious con-
sequences vis-à-vis a right under international law of the state in question—as
discussed above, cyber operations risking harm to human life and health would
certainly qualify, as, inter alia, a potential breach of sovereignty, as would those
that interfered with a state’s public health operations.
This obligation is simply the cyber application of a wide-ranging due diligence
positive obligation under general international law requiring a state to stop harm
to the rights of other states emanating from its territory. It is nothing more than a
corollary of the sovereignty that the state enjoys over its territory, which is a bun-
dle not only of rights, but also of duties. However, it must be cautioned that not
all states have publicly commented in the cyber context on whether the due dili-
gence obligation is a binding rule of international law, although there does appear
to be international consensus that it is at least a voluntary non-binding norm ap-
plicable to cyber operations.147 That said, a number of states have recently con-
firmed their acceptance of such a rule as a matter of customary international law,
joining the “International Group of Experts” that authored the Tallinn Manual on
the International Law Application to Cyber Operations.148 The French position is
representative:
In accordance with the due diligence principle, “States should not knowingly
allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs”
[information and communications technology], including acts that infringe the
territorial integrity or sovereignty of another State. In addition, States must
ensure that non-state actors do not use their territory to carry on such activities,
and not use proxies to commit internationally wrongful acts using ICTs.149
The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to strengthen the willingness of states to
support characterization of due diligence as a binding obligation.150 After all,
147. Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, U.N. Doc. A/68/98*, ¶23 (June 24, 2013)
(“States should seek to ensure that their territories are not used by non-State actors for unlawful use of
ICTs.”); Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, U.N. Doc. A/70/174, ¶28(f) (July 22,
2015) (“States must not use proxies to commit internationally wrongful acts using ICTs, and should seek
to ensure that their territory is not used by non-State actors to commit such acts.”).
148. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 17, r. 6.
149. Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, supra note 27, at 10. See also, e.g., Netherlands MFA
Letter, supra note 27, at 4-5; Finland, Statement at 2d Substantive Session of OEWG (Feb. 10-14, 2020),
https://perma.cc/5RQ8-VUMD.
150. Declaration by the High Representative Josep Borrell, on Behalf of the European Union, on
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why would any responsible state not take feasible measures to put an end to such
activity?
This raises the question of whether a positive protective obligation to prevent
transboundary harm to human life and health exists under international human
rights law. As we have explained, the existence of a protective obligation is not
controversial. What is controversial is its (extra)territorial scope of application. If
a state exercises spatial jurisdiction (control of territory) beyond those areas over
which it has sovereignty, for example as a belligerent occupier, the protective
duty certainly would apply. Russia, for instance, has the obligation to secure or
ensure the human rights of people in Crimea, even though it lacks sovereignty
over Crimea.
A more difficult question is whether a protective duty would apply in the ab-
sence of territorial control. For instance, would Russia have such an obligation
vis-à-vis pandemic-related cyberattacks or misinformation emanating from its
territory and affecting individuals in, say, Germany or the UK. One of us has pre-
viously argued that no such obligation would exist without territorial control.151 It
is difficult, for example, to see how the jurisprudence of the European Court in
particular could sustain such an obligation.
However, in recent years a number of other human rights bodies have put for-
ward much more expansive interpretations, mainly with regard to transboundary
harm caused by corporate entities domiciled within or operating from a state’s
territory. Thus, for example, both the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights152 and the Human Rights Committee153 have held that an extrater-
ritorial protective obligation would exist in such circumstances under the
ICESCR and the ICCPR. So has the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
which has held that an extraterritorial protective obligation would arise with
respect to transboundary environmental harm affecting the right to life, even
when such harm is caused by private actors.154
EUROPEAN UNION (Apr. 30, 2020 13:00), https://perma.cc/QAN8-NLR6 (“The European Union and its
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If this jurisprudence is taken as a starting point, it would appear a reasonably
straightforward analogy to say that states have a duty to prevent transboundary
harm to life and health caused by cyber and misinformation operations emanating
from their territory. Such an obligation would apply regardless of the identity of
the immediate perpetrator of the harm—which could be a corporate entity, a
hacker group, an armed group, or even a third state. We can see no reason why
these human rights bodies (with the exception of the European Court) would not
apply the same reasoning to cyber harm during the pandemic. That said, it must
be acknowledged that the existence of such a positive obligation is more contro-
versial than that of a negative obligation for the state itself not to cause transboun-
dary harm, which we examined above.
On a final note, if a due diligence obligation to stop hostile cyber operations
and misinformation harmful to human life and health emanating from a state’s
own territory and affecting another state already exists under general interna-
tional law, why should it matter whether a similar obligation would also exist
under human rights law? That obligation would not be redundant for three rea-
sons. First, a protective human rights obligation would be owed not (just) to other
states, but also directly to affected individuals. Second, these individuals would
have certain remedies available to them, such as litigation before domestic courts
and international human rights bodies. Third, substantively the positive human
rights obligations might be more demanding than the general international law
one. Human rights jurisprudence has frequently incorporated more systemic and
preventive duties into protective obligations,155 unlike, arguably, the due dili-
gence obligation under general international law.156 Normatively, the greater in-
tensity of the preventive obligation under human rights law would be justified by
the importance of the interests at stake, that is, the direct adverse consequences to
human life and health.
CONCLUSION
International law can play a robust role in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic.
As discussed above, and as recently noted by the Dutch government,
. . . malicious cyber operations targeting healthcare systems or facilities could,
depending on the specific circumstances, be qualified as a violation of interna-
tional law. Equally, cyber enabled information operations that intervene with,
for example national crisis response mechanisms during a health crisis, could,
depending on the circumstances, be qualified as violation of international
law.157
possible responsibility of that State for failing to comply with its obligation to prevent transboundary
damage.”). See also Antal Berkes, A New Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Link Recognised by the
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A state’s COVID-19-related cyber operations can violate the sovereignty
of the state into which they are conducted, intervene in that state’s internal
affairs, or even amount to a wrongful use of force against it. They may also
violate the human rights of individuals on the state’s own territory and
beyond.
Further, states have a duty under human rights law to combat certain cyber
operations related to the pandemic, including misinformation by states and non-
state actors, in order to protect the human rights to life and health of those on its
territory. Arguably, they shoulder the same obligation when cyber operations
affecting the human rights of individuals beyond their borders are launched from
or through their territory. In doing so, however, states must not unduly infringe
upon other human rights, such as the freedom of expression. The pandemic must
not be used opportunistically as a pretext for state censorship of criticism and dis-
sent, whether online or offline. This is especially so because the “freedom of
opinion and expression goes hand-in-glove with public health.”158 Finally, in our
estimation, states must, pursuant to the general international law due diligence
obligation, take feasible measures to put an end to hostile cyber operations
launched from their territories by another state or a non-state actor that are related
to the COVID-19 pandemic if they cause serious adverse consequences with
respect to the rights of other states, the most likely such right being respect for its
sovereignty.
However, as should be clear, some aspects of the law are far from settled. For
instance, at least one state, wrongly in our view, rejects the existence of the gen-
eral international law rule most likely to be breached by COVID-19-related cyber
operations, sovereignty. In doing so, it has denied itself the opportunity to con-
demn other states that launch harmful cyber operations during this pandemic, as
well as the right to respond with countermeasures under the law of state responsi-
bility. And many other aspects of the relevant law are the subject of normative
uncertainty, such as the extraterritorial application of human rights obligations to
respect and protect.
It is difficult to find anything positive about this horrific global pandemic.
However, it can help draw attention to the criticality of moving the international
cyber law discourse among states forward much more quickly than has been the
case to date. Many states have been cautious about proffering their interpretation
of the applicable law, and to some extent rightfully so, but caution has consequen-
ces. It can leave us normatively ill-prepared for the next crisis. Some states have
condemned the COVID-19-related cyber operations, although seldom on the ba-
sis of international law, as distinct from political norms of responsible state
158. Kaye, supra note 141, ¶10.
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behavior.159 Hopefully, they will add legal granularity to future statements. But
all states, human rights courts, human rights monitoring bodies, the academy, the
private sector, and NGOs must take up the challenge presented by this tragic pan-
demic to move the law governing cyberspace in the right direction.160
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